Russian Grey Zone Operations Could Trigger NATO Mutual Defence Clause
Dr. Vijay Sakhuja
Earlier this month, NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels and underlined the “global nature of the threats” that the Alliance faces. In particular, they flagged the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, turmoil in the Middle East, Israel-Palestine (Hamas) crisis, developments in Syria, the nexus between Russia and Iran. It was also highlighted that China along with Russia were attempting to “destabilize” through “sabotage, cyber-attacks, and energy blackmail”.
The Secretary-General Mark Rutte observed that NATO “will work closely together with the EU on these issues”. The configuration between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea (CRINK) was of consequences to the NATO members particularly the deployment of North Korean troops in the Kursk region at the behest of Russia, is worrying the NATO.
In particular, the NATO member states are concerned that Russia is blatantly waging “hybrid war of aggression”. The German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has said that President Vladimir Putin has launched an aggressive “hybrid war of aggression” which is affecting “European peace” and is attempting to “shake our democratic societies”. Meanwhile, Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky revealed that in 2024 nearly 20 percent of the 500 suspicious incidents in Europe were attributable to Russia.
These Russian non-kinetic hybrid attacks against the NATO members fall under the category of ‘grey zone’. This form of warfare is understood as an unconventional military response to achieve strategic aims albeit without a military conflict. The aggressor pursues “ambiguous, belligerent, and coercive actions” that do not adhere to the “traditional black-or-white dichotomy of war and peace; instead, they fall somewhere in the undefined middle.” It employs regular and irregular forces, platforms, weapons, cyber threats, damaging or severing submarine cables, etc., to maximize impact. Furthermore, Grey Zone operations, in most cases are sanctioned by the State (either out of choice or inevitability) therefore are part of the statecraft.
The most recent incident was in November 2024 when two submarine telecommunications cables linking Finland, Germany, Lithuania, and Sweden. This led many NATO members to believe that it was “hybrid warfare” by Russia. However American intelligence officials assessed that the cable was “not cut deliberately” by Yi Peng 3, a Chinese flagged merchant ship owned by Ningbo Yipeng Shipping Co. Ltd., a Chinese company. The vessel’s last port of call was Ust-Luga in the Baltic Sea and was bound for Cairo in Egypt. It had transited through the area where the cables were found cut. The vessel was intercepted at sea by the navies and law enforcement agencies from European countries. Apparently the Chinese government instructed the Company to “co-operate with the investigation”. It has now been confirmed that the Chinese ship did not “deliberately damage” the cable and the Superintendent of the Swedish police clarified that although the “current classification of the crime is sabotage” and this “may change”, “because it cannot be ruled out that the cables were deliberately damaged,”
In the past too there have been incidents when submarine cables were cut causing major digital disruptions in European countries. In 2022, an underwater cable connecting mainland Norway with Svalbard Island was cut and the investigations concluded that it was due to “human activity”. In 2023, Baltic Connector pipeline between Finland and Estonia along with two underwater cables were damaged when a Chinese flagged vessel dragged its anchor through them. Earlier in 2022, the Nordstream attacks involving two gas pipelines connecting Russia with Germany were damaged due to “mysterious underwater explosions”.
Russia is also accused of Spoofing passenger planes and merchant vessels. According to media, between December 2023 and June 2024 as many as 350 commercial flights per day came under Russian jamming and affected over 50,000 flights in the Baltic Sea air space.
At sea, many reports of automatic identification system (AIS) blackouts and spoofing have been linked to the shadow fleet used by Russia to ship its oil and gas to interested countries. This operation involves ‘going dark' by switching off the AIS transponder thus making such vessels undetectable by satellites or shore-based tracking systems. The Russian-flagged vessels are reported to go dark when conducting ship-to-ship (STS) transfers or when entering or transiting sea areas under high surveillance. It is estimated that nearly 600 tankers of various sizes are part of the Russian shadow fleet and during January to August 2024, at least three shadow tankers departed Russian ports every day accounting for “around 800 voyages”. The European Union member states have called for additional sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet through surveillance and tighter shipping controls including transit through EU waters particularly in the Baltic Sea.
Russian Grey Zone operations have caused anxiety among NATO members about the potency of this type of warfare. Should the frequency and effectiveness of ‘below the level of direct contact operations’ increase to unacceptable levels, it could attract NATO mutual defense clause by the member states.
Dr. Vijay Sakhuja is Professor and Head, Center of Excellence for Geopolitics and International Studies (CEGIS), REVA University, Bengaluru.
